

Mitra, Varuṇa thenceforward did, in that he succeeded. Hence it is quite proper that a Brāhmaṇ should be without a king, but were he to obtain a king, it would be conducive to the success (of both.) It is, however, quite improper that a king should be without a Brāhmaṇ, for whatever deed he does, unsped by Mitra, the priesthood, therein he succeeds not.* ✓ This passage, it will be observed, represents the mutual relations of Brāhmaṇa and Kṣatriya in the terms of the attributes of intelligence and will. (It therefore follows that the Brāhmaṇa is the mainspring of the activities of the Kṣatriya.) ✓ This point is further developed in the above passage by means of a legend of the divine prototypes of the two classes, which finally leads to the conclusion (that the kingly power involves as its necessary adjunct the priestly power, not *vice versa*.) ✓ From this conception of the priestly power as being the motive force as well as the indispensable adjunct of the kingly power, it is but one step to draw out the notion that the latter is derived from the former. This step is taken in a passage of the Śat. Br. which categorically states that the nobility is produced out of the priesthood.†

* IV. 1. 4. 1-6. S. B. E. Vol. XXVI. pp. 269-271.

† XII. 7. 3. 12. The doctrine stated above, namely that the Brāhmaṇa is the source of the Kṣatriya, finds expression in a remarkable theory of the origin of the four classes which occurs in the supplementary portion of the Śat. Br. (XIV. 4. 2. 1 = Brihadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad I. 4. 11-15). "Verily in the beginning there was Brahman, one only. That being one, was not strong enough. It created still further the most excellent Kṣattra (power), namely those Kṣattras among the Devās,— Indra, Varuṇa, Soma, Rudra, Parjanya, Yama, Mṛityu, Iśāna. He was not strong enough. He created the Viś (people), the classes of Devas which in their different orders are

These views of the mutual relations of the Brāhmaṇa and the Kṣatriya are partially reflected in the theory of the relative position of two representative members of these classes. The purohita (domestic chaplain) indeed stood in a special relation to the king, and hence the inter-relations of these functionaries form the subject of some important speculations of the Vedic canonists. (The *Ait. Br.* states in one place that the purohita is one-half of the Kṣatriya.*) The most considerable body of its reflections on this point, however, occurs in the last chapter recommending the employment of the domestic priest by the king.† It is there declared that the purohita with his wife and son is the king's threefold sacrificial fire. His title indeed is said to be protector of the kingdom (*rāstragopa*). It is further stated that the purohita is the god of fire possessing five destructive powers. In the expressive language of the text he surrounds the king with

called Vasus, Rudras, Ādityas, Viśve Devas, Maruts. He was not strong enough. He created the Śūdra colour (caste), as Pūshan (as nourisher)..... Among the Devas that Brahman existed as Agni (fire) only, among men as Brāhmaṇa, as Kṣatriya through the (divine) Kṣatriya, as Vaiśya through the (divine) Vaiśya, as Śūdra through the (divine) Śūdra. Therefore people wish for their future state among the Devas through Agni (the sacrificial fire) only; and among men through the Brāhmaṇa, for in these two forms did Brahman exist." S. B. E. Vol. XV, pp. 88-90. In this account of cosmic creation it will be observed that the First Cause is represented as successively creating the divine prototypes of the Kṣatriyas, the Vaiśyas and the Śūdras, while nothing is mentioned about the creation of the Brāhmaṇas. Indeed it is declared that while the original creative principle is manifested directly in the form of the Brāhmaṇa it manifests itself as Kṣatriya, Vaiśya and Śūdra through a derivative order of gods.

* VII. 26.*

† VIII, 24-27.*

these powers as the sea surrounds the earth. If the purohita is propitiated, he conveys the king to heaven and makes him obtain the royal dignity, bravery, a kingdom and subjects, but if he is not propitiated, he deprives the king of these blessings. The purohita, then, according to this view, is the partner and the coadjutor, the 'alter ego,' of the king. Nay more, he is the active Providence ruling the kingdom as well as the king.

We may pause here to mention one important feature of the theories concerning the position of the priestly class in the State. In the passages quoted above from the Vedic Samhitās and the Brāhmaṇas it may be observed that the authority of the priest is never derived from his divine nature. In this respect the theories with which we are concerned present a marked contrast to the doctrine of the nature of the king's office. The Vedic works indeed invest the Brāhmaṇas from the first with divine sanctity. In the Rigveda, where it is true the term signifies not merely a hereditary caste but also a seer as well as a specific order of priests, there are passages associating the Brāhmaṇas with the gods. Thus in one place the priest addresses the Brāhmaṇas along with the auspicious and sinless heaven and earth as well as the god Pūṣan (Sun) for protection from evil.* Another passage conveys the poet's prayer to the

* Rv. VI. 75. 10 ; "May the Brāhmaṇa fathers, drinkers of Soma, may the auspicious, the sinless, heaven and earth, may Pūṣan preserve us, who prosper by righteousness, from evil." Muir, *Original Sanskrit Texts*, Vol. I. p. 252. Wilson's translation (Vol. IV. p. 26) is somewhat different : "May the Brahmans, the progenitors, presenters of the Soma, observers of truth, protect us."

god Soma who has entered into the **Brāhmaṇas**.* In the later literature where the notion of a hereditary priestly caste has crystallised into shape, the conception of the Brāhmaṇa's sanctity is carried to a greater length. (The Atharvaveda has a set of five hymns the burden of which is to teach the inviolability of the Brāhmaṇa's person and property.) In the course of this description we are introduced to the doctrine that the Brāhmaṇa enjoys the special protection of deities like Agni, Soma, Indra, and Varuṇa.† The Yajurveda and the Brāhmaṇas are distinguished by their open, not to say aggressive, assertion of the divinity of the Brāhmaṇas. A passage of the Taitt. Sam. distinguishes between two classes of gods, namely, the gods who receive offerings secretly and the Brāhmaṇas who receive them openly.‡ The Śat. Br. declares

* Rv. X. 16. 6 : "Should the black crow, the ant, the snake, the wild beast, harm (a limb) of thee, may Agni the all-devourer and the Soma that has pervaded the Brahmanas, make it whole." Wilson's translation Vol. VI. p. 40.

† Compare the following extracts from the hymns above mentioned, Av. V, 17, 1-2 : "These spoke first at the offence against the Brāhmaṇa (brahman) ; the boundless sea, Mātariśvan, he of stout rage (haras), formidable fervour, the kindly one, the heavenly waters, first-born of right (rita). King Soma first gave back the Brāhmaṇa's wife, not bearing enmity ; he who went after (her) was Varuṇa, Mitra ; Agni, invoker, conducted (her) hither, seizing her hand." H. O. B. Vol. VII, p. 248 ; Av. V. 18. 6 : "The Brāhmaṇa is not to be injured, like fire, by one who holds himself dear ; for Soma is his heir, Indra his protector against imprecation ;" Av. V. 18. 14 : "Agni verily our guide, Soma is called (our) heir, Indra slayer of imprecation (?) : so know the devout that" Ibid pp. 251-252 ; Av. V. 19. 10. "King Varuṇa called that a god-made poison ; no one soever, having devoured the cow of the Brāhmaṇa, keeps watch in the kingdom." Ibid, p. 254.

‡ Taitt. Sam. I. 7. 3. 1 ; "Secretly offering is made to one set of gods, openly to another. The gods who receive offering

in two places that a Brāhmaṇa descended from a sage (ṛiṣi) represents all the deities,* while other passages inculcating the merit of making gifts to Brāhmaṇas explicitly style them human gods.†

U. We have reserved for examination, in the last place, an important conception the germs of which occur in some passages of the Upaniṣads and which became the foundation of the whole scheme of social and political order in the later Brāhmaṇical canon. (This was the concept of Law or Duty (dharma).) In the account of cosmic creation quoted above from the Brihadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad, it has been seen how Brahman is described as successively creating the divine prototypes of the Kṣatriyas, the Vaiśyas, and the Śūdras. Then it proceeds, "He was not strong enough. He created still further the most excellent Law (dharma). Law is the Kṣattra of the Kṣattra, therefore there is nothing higher than the Law. (Thenceforth even a weak man rules a stronger with the help of the Law as with the help of a king.) Thus the Law is what is called the true. And if a man declares what is true, they say he declares the Law ; and if he declares the Law, they say he declares what is true. Thus both are the same." ‡ According to this passage, then,

secretly, he thus offers to them in sacrifice ; in that he brings the Anvāhārya mess (i.e. a mess of food cooked with rice given to the priests as a Dakṣiṇā)—the Brāhmaṇas are the gods openly^a—them he verily delights." H. O. Vol. XVIII. p. 100. Cf. Maitr. Sam. I. 4. 6. and Kauṣika Sūtra VI. 26-27.

* XII. 4. 4. 6 ; Ibid 7.

† II. 2. 2. 6 ; 4. 3. 14 ; IV. 3. 4. 4. Cf. the passages quoted above from the Brāhmaṇas, identifying the priestly order with the god Brihaspati.

‡ Br. Up. I. 4. 11:-15. S. B. E. Vol. XV. pp. 89-90.

Law is derived from the will of the Creator. Further, Law represents the highest positive authority supplementing the powers of the three inferior classes, and overriding in particular the civil authority represented by the office of the Kṣatriya. In the last place, Law is synonymous with Morality. While such is the origin and character of the concept of Law, its scope is defined elsewhere to be co-extensive with part of the social order. "There are three branches of the law," declares the Chhāndogya Upaniṣad in one place, "sacrifice, study, and charity are the first, ⁽²⁾ austerities the second, and to dwell as a Brahmachārin in the house of a tutor, always mortifying the body in the house of a tutor, is the third. All these obtain the worlds of the blessed; but the Brahmaśāsthī alone (he who is firmly grounded in Brahman) obtains immortality."* This passage evidently includes the duties of the first three stages (āśramas) of the Aryan's life within the compass of the Law. It would further appear to invest these duties with a high spiritual significance, for it explicitly declares their fulfilment to lead to heavenly bliss. In the following chapter it will be our endeavour to describe how all the above elements are gathered together, and are developed into the comprehensive concept of Society or the social order of which the functions of the king form merely a branch.

* Chh. Up. 11. 23. 1-2; Ibid, Vol. 1 p. 35.

CHAPTER II.

THE EPOCH OF GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT—THE DHARMASŪTRAS AND THE EARLY LITERATURE OF THE ART OF GOVERNMENT (ARTHA- ŚĀSTRA), C. 600—300 B. C.—THE BUDDHIST CANON, C. 400—300 B.C.

I

General character of political thought in the Dharmasūtras—The concept of Dharma (Law or Duty) presupposes a Society ruled by Law which is derived from the Divine will—Nevertheless it embodies the conception of the organic unity of Society—The theories of kingship involve, although in an unsystematic fashion, the balancing of the principles of authority and responsibility—The mutual relations of the king and the Brāhmaṇa order.

II

The early Arthasāstra contributed some of the most original chapters to Hindu political theory—Its two sources—Antiquity of the Arthasāstra—Prof. D. R. Bhandarkar's view considered—Definition, scope, and method, of Arthasāstra—Definition of Daṇḍanīti—Mr. K. P. Jayaswal's view considered—Criticism of the traditional enumeration of the sciences by three Arthasāstra schools—Arthasāstra and Rājadharmā compared—Relative value of Rājadharmā and other groups of duties—The doctrine of seven elements of sovereignty and the category of three powers of the king—Graded arrangement of the seven elements indicates the absence of the idea of organic unity of government—The importance of the king's office—The king's divine nature and the duties of the subjects

towards him—The king's duty of protection and the rule of justice—The right of tyrannicide—The Arthaśāstra statecraft and its strong Machiavellian note—The Brāhmaṇa and the king rule by Divine ordination—The king rules by sufferance of the Brāhmaṇa—Early Arthaśāstra thought was distinguished by the qualities of boldness and enthusiasm, although not free from the defects of youth—The services of the Arthaśāstra authors to the cause of Hindu political theory.

III

The Buddhist canonists deal incidentally with a few chosen topics of the State, but they share with the authors of the Dharmasūtras and the Arthaśāstra the credit of being the makers of Hindu political theory—The Buddhist story of the origin of kingship involves Social as well as Governmental Contracts, but is unconnected with any system of rights and duties—The Buddhistic list of the seven conditions of success of the Vajjian (republican) confederacy.

I

With the period forming the subject-matter of the present chapter we open a new and interesting page in the history of Hindu political theory. The age of experiment, as it may be called, is past, that of growth and development has begun. The Brāhmaṇas which are the true fountain-head of the Hindu ideas of the State are not wanting in striking reflections relating to the nature of the king's office, the mutual relations of the king and the Brāhmaṇa order and the like questions. But these, as we have endeavoured to show elsewhere, involve a long and painful

process of groping which is the mute witness of the birth-throes of a new thought, and they occur intermixed with extraneous matter in the form of dogmatic expositions of the great ceremonies of royal and imperial consecration. In the present period a change comes over the scene. The practical spirit of the age found vent in the preparation of short aphoristic manuals based on the teachings of the earlier canon, and the priestly authors of these works, the founders of the Vedic schools of sacred law (Sūtracharaṇas) carefully separate their description of the sacrificial rituals that are treated in the Śrauta and the Grihya Sūtras, from the first arranged list of duties pertaining to the constituent classes and sections of the community, that is laid down in the Dharmasūtras. A new departure moreover, is signaled by the schools and authors of the Arthaśāstra who bring into being an independent branch of knowledge avowedly concerned with the acquisition and the preservation of States. Finally, the founders of the Buddhist canon, the leaders of a new heresy, introduced a rich leaven into the general ferment of ideas through their daring speculations into the origin of the social and the political order, and the conditions of the republican communities.

With this brief survey of the prevailing tendencies of the present period, let us embark on an examination of the works that fall within the limits of this chapter. And first, as regards the Dharmasūtras, it has to be remarked at the outset that the political ideas of the priestly authors do not assume the character of a system: they are rather of the nature of

scattered hints which it is left for other schools and authors to develop and mature. At the root of these ideas, however, there lies the unified concept of a social order. ✓ The canonical authors of the Dharmasūtras, indeed, treat the public functions of the king not in themselves, but as part and parcel of the Whole Duty of this personage, and, in a wider sense, as an incident in a comprehensive scheme of duties ordained by the Highest God. ✓ This might perhaps be taken to imply that Politics comprising the sum of the king's governmental functions did not rank in these canonical works as an independent science, but it counted as a branch of Positive Law governing the whole conduct of the king, and claiming to derive its origin from the Divine will.

✓ The concept of Dharma introduces us to the grand notion of our authors which has been just mentioned, namely, the notion of the social order. As conceived in the Dharmasūtras, the concept presupposes the division of society into a number of component parts, such as the four castes (varṇas) and the four stages of life (āśramas), each of which is subject to a specific body of rules. ✓ The source of these social divisions as well as of the rules binding them is said to lie in the will of the Supreme Being. It therefore follows that Society, as here conceived, is the rule of Law, the Law being held to be imposed from without by the Divine will.* This avowed belief in the dogmatic basis of the social order

* We must, however, observe that apart from the authority attaching to the rules of the varṇas and the āśramas by virtue of their divine creation, they are held

might seem to exclude all possibilities of rational speculation in respect of its nature. Such, however, is not the case in actual practice. In the social scheme unfolded in the Dharmasūtras, one may detect beneath the outer garb of dogma a keen appreciation of the principle of specialization and division of labour, as well as that of the organic unity of society. ✓ "Brahman forsooth," so runs a passage of Baudhāyana, "placed its majesty

even in the Dharmasūtras to contain their sanction within themselves. This is based on the certainty that the observance of these rules will lead to true welfare, while their violation will bring about misery. Cf. Gautama XI 29-30 : "(Men of) the (several) castes and orders who always live according to their duty enjoy after death the rewards of their works, and by virtue of a remnant of their (merit) they are born again in excellent countries, castes, and families, (endowed) with beauty, long life, learning in the Vedas, (virtuous) conduct, wealth, happiness, and wisdom. Those who act in a contrary manner perish, being born again in various (evil conditions)"; Apast. II. 5. 11. 10-11 : "In successive births men of the lower castes are born in the next higher one, if they have fulfilled their duties. In successive births men of the higher castes are born in the next lower one, if they neglect their duties"; Ibid II. 9. 21. 1-2 : "There are four orders, viz. the order of householders, the order of students, the order of ascetics, and the order of hermits in the woods. If he lives in all these four according to the rules (of the law), without allowing himself to be disturbed (by anything), he will obtain salvation."

Thus the Dharmasūtras would appear to predicate a twofold source of the authority of their rules of human conduct. It is interesting to observe that these principles of divine creation and intrinsic worth are held in some of the great philosophical systems to inhere in the concept of Dharma itself, of which the above rules are the product. Kapāda, the reputed author of the Vaiśeṣika Sūtras, indeed stresses the latter quality alone, for he defines (I. 1.2) Dharma as that from which results the fulfilment of welfare and salvation (yatobhhyudayanihāreyasasiddhiḥ sa dharmah). On the other hand Jaimini appears to combine the twofold

in the Brāhmaṇas, together with (the duties and privileges of) studying, teaching, sacrificing for themselves, sacrificing for others, liberality, and accepting (gifts), for the protection of the Vedas ; in the Kṣatriyas it placed (strength), together with (the duties and privileges of) studying, sacrificing, liberality, (using) weapons, and protecting the treasure (and the life of) created beings, for the growth of (good) government ; in the Vaiśyas (it placed the power of work), together with (the duties of) studying, sacrificing, liberality, cultivating (the soil), trading, and tending cattle, for the growth of (productive) labour. On the Śūdras (it imposed the duty of) serving the three higher (castes).”*

In the scheme of duties just described, it will be noticed that the function of protection is reserved for a special class, namely, the Kṣatriyas. This would seem to involve as its necessary corollary an

basis of Dharma, for he defines it (Mīmāṃsāsūtras, I. 1. 2. 2) as that which is desirable and is indicated by the Vedic injunction (chodanālakṣaṇārtho dharmah). In the Mīmāṃsā system the intrinsic authority of Dharma is sought to be explained by assuming the existence of an invisible force (apūrva) attaching to men's actions. The doctrine is thus interpreted by Colebrooke. “The subject which most engages attention throughout the Mīmāṃsā, recurring at every turn, is the invisible or spiritual operation of an act of merit. The action ceases, yet the consequence does not immediately arise, a virtue meantime subsists unseen, but efficacious to connect the consequence with its past and remote cause, and to bring about, at a distant period or in another world, the relative effect. That unseen virtue is termed Apūrva, being a relation superinduced, not before possessed.” (Quoted, Priyanath Sen, *Principles of Hindu Jurisprudence*, p. 27).

* Ibid I, 10, 18. 2-5 S. B. E. Vol. XIV. p. 199.

oligarchical constitution in which the Kṣatriyas monopolised the political power. Nevertheless the Dharmasūtras expressly entrust the function of government to the king who is indeed the Kṣatriya *par excellence*. To him belong the duties of lawful punishment, State relief of the Brāhmaṇas and other people, fighting the enemy, levying of taxes, administration of justice, appointment of State officers, performance of sacrifices, and the like.* The bare enumeration of these duties is enough to show how the king's public functions are blended in the Dharmasūtras with his domestic functions in the category of the Whole Duty of this personage.

Proceeding to the theories of kingship in the canonical works, we may observe that the conception of a system of laws governing the constituent members of the community, which is that of the Dharmasūtras, has obviously the result of limiting the king's powers. Yet the ideas of the Dharmasūtras are not centred on the limitation of the king's powers alone, but they involve in however unsystematic a fashion the balancing of the principles of authority and responsibility. In this respect, indeed, the Dharmasūtras follow in the track laid down by the Brāhmaṇas. The basis of the king's authority however is sought in the later canon to lie, not in the dogma of the king's divine nature, but in his fulfilment of the fundamental needs of the individual and of the society. Gautama writes in one place, "A king and a Brāhmaṇa, deeply versed in the Vedas, these two, uphold the

* Cf. Gaut. X. 7-48; Ibid XI; Vas. I. 41-48; Ibid XVI. 2-9; Ibid XIX; Baudh. I. 10. 18. Aṣṭ II 10. 25-26.

moral order in the world. On them depends the existence of the four-fold human race, of internally conscious beings, of those which move on feet and on wings, and of those which creep, (as well as) the protection of offspring, the prevention of the confusion (of the castes and) the sacred law." * This striking dictum might have been based upon a text of the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa describing the king and the learned Brāhmaṇa as upholders of the sacred law. † But while the earlier author derives from this text the conception of the natural and necessary limitations of the powers of both, the later writer amplifies it with the object of magnifying their importance. The later view virtually amounts to this, that the king's office is, along with that of the Brāhmaṇa, the foundation of the social and the moral order as well as the indispensable condition of the bare existence of the people. The full import of this idea as justifying a wide range of duties owed by the subjects to their sovereign is not brought out till we reach the contemporary Arthaśāstra and the later Brahminical canon. Nevertheless it is observable that Gautama in one place derives from the king's function of protection his right of immunity from censure. He writes, "The advice of the spiritual teacher and the punishment (inflicted by the king) guard them. Therefore a king and a spiritual teacher must not be reviled." ‡

* Gaut. VIII. 1-3. S. B. E. Vol. II. pp. 211-212.

† Supra, p. 41.

‡ Gaut. XI. 31-32, S. B. E. Vol. II. p. 235. The same duty is inculcated by Apastamba who declares (I. 11. 31. 5) that a pious householder must not speak evil of the gods or of the king.

Let us next consider the ideas and notions of the Dharmasūtras which tend to counteract the above doctrine of the king's authority. To begin with the most fundamental point, the concept of Dharma implies, as we have seen before, that the king is governed in the whole course of his conduct by a body of rules claiming to derive their origin from the highest source, namely the will of the Supreme Being. Specifically, this responsibility to the Divine Law is illustrated in the rule of the Dharmasūtras making the king liable to sin for the unjust exercise of his power.* The Dharmasūtras invoke the aid of the penitential discipline to enforce the duty of just government upon the king.† With this may be connected the fact that Gāutama imposes an intellectual training as well as moral discipline upon the king.‡ The sanction of spiritual or temporal penalty, however, it should be observed in the present place, is not the only incentive to the king's good government. For the authors of the Dharmasūtras inculcate protection by making the king participate in the

* Cf. Apast. II. 11. 28. 13. "If the king does not punish a punishable offence, the guilt falls upon him." Baudhayana (I. 10. 19. 8) makes the king liable to one-fourth of the sin following from unjust trials.

† Thus Gautama (XII. 48) prescribes a penance for the king who neglects to inflict punishment, while Vāśiṣṭha (XIX. 40-43) imposes a penance upon the king as well as the purohita in the event of the unjust decision of suits.

‡ Gaut. XI. 2-4. "(The king shall be) holy in acts and speech, fully instructed in the (threefold (sacred science) and in logic, pure, of subdued senses, surrounded by companions possessing excellent qualities and by the means (for upholding his rule)." Bühler's translation.

spiritual merits and demerits of the subjects.* While in the above cases the king's duty is derived directly from the Divine Will, a somewhat rational basis of the same is suggested, by a passage of Baudhāyana. ~~He~~ writes, "Let the king protect (his) subjects receiving as his pay a sixth part." † In this passage is evidently involved the view that the king is an official paid by the subjects for the service of protection. In this case the king's duty of protection would follow as a logical corollary from his collection of taxes. This doctrine of the relation of taxation to protection is of great importance in Hindu political theory. The later writers recur to it far down into the Middle Ages, and it is incorporated in the theories, Buddhist as well as Brahminical, of the origin of kingship. ‡

* Gautama, *e.g.*, declares (XI 11) that the king obtains a share of the spiritual merit gained by his subjects; while Viṣṇu (III 28) mentions that a sixth part both of the virtuous deeds and of the iniquitous acts committed by the subjects devolves upon the king.

† I. 10. 18. 1. 'Receiving as his pay'. the term used in the original is 'bhritah' which the commentator Govindasvāmin explains as 'bhritirvetanam dhanam tadgrāhī bhritah.' The use of 'vetana' (wage) to indicate the king's dues is noticeable.

‡ The rule of Baudhāyana just cited, along with similar passages from other Hindu authors, has been interpreted in recent times as justifying a wider power of the people over the king than, we think, is warranted by the texts. Prof. Pramatha Nath Banerjea (*Public Administration in Ancient India*, pp. 72-73) claims on the authority of the above text of Baudhāyana as well as other passages from Kauṭilya, the Śukraniti and the Mahābhārata that "the conception of the king as the servant of the state was one of the basic principles of political thought in Ancient India." Practically the same view is

In the course of our survey of the ideas of kingship in the Dharmasūtras, we have seen how one of the priestly authors treated the office of the Brāhmaṇa in conjunction with that of the king, and declared both of them to be in effect the foundation of individual existence as well as of social order. This dictum, we think, is important as furnishing, probably for the first time, a theoretical argument in favour of the old canonical doctrine of the joint authority of the king and the Brāhmaṇa over all the rest,

held by Prof. D. R. Bhandarkar (*Carmichael Lectures*, Part I, pp. 122-123) who quotes Baudhāyana's text along with other passages from the Dharmasūtras, Kauṭilya, and the Śānti-parvan to show that according to the Hindu notion the king "never wielded any unqualified power, but was looked upon as merely a public servant though of the highest order." We are not quite sure whether the claim advanced on behalf of the people can be upheld in the present case. There is no warrant in the authorities cited for a statement such as that the king derives his authority from the people in whom is vested the ultimate sovereignty. On the contrary, the deeply rooted idea of the authors is that the Kṣatriya order in which the king is included is ordained by the Supreme Being to protect the people and is subject to the Dharma imposed by His will. In the passage (I. 188) quoted by Dr. Banerjea from the Śukranīti in this connexion, the king is indeed declared to be appointed to the service of the people, but this appointment, it is expressly stated, is ordained by Brahmā. It might be argued that the text of Śukra (II. 274-275) quoted by Dr. Banerjea which justifies the right of deposition of the bad king, along with other texts from the Mahābhārata justifying the right of tyrannicide, pointed to the popular control over the king. Such passages, however, are of too exceptional a character to be accepted as the standard expression of the Hindu theory. We are, therefore, inclined to hold that the Hindu thinkers tended to the view, which is however implied rather than expressed, that the king is the servant of the Supreme God.

Regarding the mutual relations of these powers, we may first observe that Vaśiṣṭha quotes with approval the old Vedic text declaring Soma to be the king of the Brāhmaṇas, while Gautama expresses the idea more clearly by saying that the king is master of all with the exception of the Brāhmaṇas.* Not only do our authors hold, after the fashion of the Brāhmaṇa works, that the priestly power is independent of the kingly power, but they also make in the earlier manner the one superior to the other. Speaking of the respective functions of the king and the Brāhmaṇa, Vaśiṣṭha says in one place, "The three (lower) classes shall live according to the teaching of the Brāhmaṇa. The Brāhmaṇa shall declare their duties, and the king shall govern them accordingly."† The king, then, is as it were, merely a magistrate charged with the duty of carrying out the law laid down by the Brāhmaṇas.‡ After this, it is perhaps unnecessary to mention that Gautama quotes in one passage a Vedic text to the effect that Kṣatriyas who are assisted by the Brāhmaṇas prosper and do not fall into distress.‡ And yet it is noticeable that, perhaps owing to the greater moderation of the priestly pretensions, the authors do not press the theory of the Brāhmaṇa's superiority to the point reached in some of the Brāhmaṇa texts, namely that the priestly power is the source of the kingly power.

* Vas. I 45. (Cf. Śat. Br. V 4. 2. 3) ; Gaut. XI 1.

† Vas. I 39-41, S. B. E. Vol. XIV, pp. 7-8.

‡ Gaut. XI 14. Cf. Śat. Br. IV 1. 4. 4-6.

While the Dharmasūtras are the product of the Vedic theological schools and are inspired by the canonical tradition, the works with which we are concerned in the present place trace their origin to the independent schools and authors of political science (Arthasāstra) and contribute some of the most original and valuable chapters to the history of Hindu political theory. The early literature of the Arthasāstra may be shown, even from the scanty evidence at our disposal, to have been not only rich in stores of thought, but also to have attained a considerable size and extent. Its present condition, however, is no index of its true character. For the whole of it has perished with the exception of a few fragments that are scattered through the pages of the later Brahminical canon as well as secular Arthasāstra. Kautilya quotes the opinions of four specific schools and thirteen individual authors of the Arthasāstra.* Most of these citations are reproduced in the Nitisāra of Kāmandaka, who moreover mentions some authors unknown to Kautilya. The Śāntiparvan section of the Mahābhārata (LVIII-LIX) furnishes two lists of authors of political science (daṇḍanīti or rājasāstra), in which no less than six names can be identified with those mentioned by Kautilya.† The Śāntiparvan, moreover, contains a mass of traditions and legends connected with statecraft, which are attributed to schools and individual teachers some of whom were not known to

* For a full list of these names and references, vide D. R. Bhandarkar, op. cit., pp. 89-90.

† *Infra*, p. 69. Prof. D. R. Bhandarkar (op. cit. pp. 91-97) treats this point in full detail.

Kauṭilya.* In some cases, again, the simultaneous occurrence of identical or nearly identical verses in the Mahābhārata and the Manusamhitā stamps them, in accordance with the usually accepted canon of interpretation on this point, as the specimens of

* The following is a list of authors and schools of the Arthaśāstra that are common to the Kauṭilya and the Śāntiparvan. In the latter case those references alone are given, which clearly relate to treatises on the science of polity or else its subject-matter.

1. Viśālākṣa, Ś. LVIII 2, LIX 80-82; K. pp. 13, 27, 32, 322, 328, 382.

2. Indra, Ś. LVIII 2, LIX 83, LXIV 16 ff., LXV, CIII 4 ff. Bāhudantiputra, K. p. 14.

3. Brihaspati, Ś. LVI 39, LVIII 1, Ibid 13 ff. LXVIII 7 ff., CXXII 11; Aṅgiras (Brihaspati), Ś. LXIX 72-73. King Marutta's saying in accordance with the teaching of Brihaspati, Ś. LVII 6-7. School of Brihaspati, K. pp. 6, 29, 63, 177, 192, 375.

4. Manu, Ś. LVII 44-45, CXXI 11. School of Manu, K. pp. 6, 29, 63, 177, 192.

5. Śukra, Ś. LVI 29-30, LVII 3, Ibid 41, LVIII 2, LIX 85. CXXII 11, CXXXIX 71-72. School of Śukra, K. pp. 6, 29, 63, 177, 192.

6. Bhāradvāja, Ś. LVIII 3, CXL 3 ff.; K. pp. 13, 27, 32, 255, 322, 327, 382.

The list of teachers not mentioned by Kauṭilya but quoted in the Śāntiparvan is as follows :—

1. Gaurāśiras, LVIII 3.
2. Wind-god, LXXII 3 ff.
3. Kaśyapa, LXXIV 7 ff.
4. Vaiśravaṇa (Kubera) LXXIV. 4-18.
5. Utathya, XC 3 ff., XCI.
6. Vāmadeva, XCII 3 ff., XCIII-XCIV.
7. Śamvara, CII 31.
8. Kālakavrikiya, CIV 3 ff., CV, CVI 1 ff.
9. Vasuhoma, CXXII 1-54.
10. Kāmandaka, CXXIII 12 ff.

Kāmandaka mentions three names not known to Kauṭilya :—

- 1 Maya XII 20.
- 2 Puloman XII 21.
- 3 The Mahārṣis XII 23.

a pre-existing collection of metrical maxims and presumably the relics of the lost literature of Arthaśāstra.

Thus (the sources of the early Arthaśāstra works fall into two principal categories, namely, the Arthaśāstra of Kauṭilya and the Mahābhārata along with the Manuśamhitā. Kauṭilya's treatise is generally assigned to the period of Chandragupta Maurya's reign (c. 322-298 B. C.), while the Manuśamhitā and the Mahābhārata are held to belong to the first two centuries before and after the Christian era.) It would therefore appear *prima facie* that Kauṭilya's citations belonged to the early stage of the Arthaśāstra literature, while those of the Mahābhārata represented a somewhat later phase of the same. This presumption is confirmed by the internal evidence, since the extracts quoted in the Śāntiparvan imply an advanced stage of speculation and often involve the formulation of abstract principles, while Kauṭilya's citations belong to a period when speculation had not yet emerged from the leading-strings of the discussion on concrete issues, and it still bore the stamp of immaturity. Nevertheless the quotations in the Mahābhārata must have acquired a respectable degree of antiquity at the time of its composition, for the canonical author cites them as authoritative expositions of the king's duties (rājadharmā) and applies to them the significant title of old legend (itihāsam purātanam).†

* Vide S. B. E. (Vol. XXV, Introduction, p. xc) and D. R. Bhandarkar (op. cit. p. 103).

† It is of course not only possible but probable that many of the authorities quoted in the Śāntiparvan, especially those

How far may the date of the Arthaśāstra be carried back into the past? We have no means of giving a precise answer to this question, but the following data may help us to form some idea of its antiquity. (Already in the time of Kauṭilya the literature of the Arthaśāstra must have reached a considerable size, since he quotes no less than four specific schools and thirteen individual authors. "A School," as Prof. D. R. Bhandarkar remarks, "means a traditional handing down of a set of doctrines, and presupposes a series of āchāryas or teachers, who from time to time carried on the work of exegesis and systematisation."* Rich and extensive as is the literature of Arthaśāstra referred to by Kauṭilya, it contains within itself sufficient evidence pointing to a still earlier stratum in the history of this science. The discussions of the authorities whom Kauṭilya quotes involve, as will appear from the sequel, a number of political categories. Such are the four sciences (vidyās), the seven elements of sovereignty (prakritis) the three powers (śaktis) of the king, the seven royal vices (vyasanas) divided into two sub-groups, the six expedients of foreign policy (guṇas), and the four means of conquering an enemy. These categories must have come into general vogue when the authorities quoted by Kauṭilya composed their treatises, for otherwise they would not have been

about whom Kauṭilya is silent, belonged to the period intervening between the composition of the Kauṭilya and the Mahābhārata. Nevertheless it has been thought desirable to consider the extracts of the Mahābhārata in this section since their study could not very well be dissociated from that of the schools and teachers mentioned by Kauṭilya.

* Op. cit. p. 109.

accepted more or less implicitly by those authors. A long interval, therefore, which may well have extended over three centuries, separated these dim beginnings of Arthaśāstra thought from the time of Kauṭilya.*

* We are prepared to accept Prof. D. R. Bhandarkar's date for the beginning of the Arthaśāstra but we demur to some of his arguments. He writes (op. cit. p. 110), "All things considered, it is impossible to bring down the beginning of Indian thought in the sphere of Arthaśāstra to any period later than 650 B. C." In support of this view he advances, *inter alia*, the following reasons:—(1) One of the concluding verses of Kauṭilya's work, which begins with the words 'yena śāstram cha śāstram cha,' means that the Arthaśāstra was falling into desuetude in Kauṭilya's time and was rescued from oblivion by that author. (2) Kauṭilya does not mention Gaurasīras while he quotes the six other teachers of kingly science that are referred to in Ch. LVIII of the Śāntiparvan. Therefore Gaurasīras and probably other teachers as well were forgotten in Kauṭilya's time. (3) The Śāntiparvan (Ch. LIX) attributes the origin of Daṇḍanīti to the god Brahmā and the creation of the different treatises on it to the different gods and demi-gods. "This means that in the 4th century B. C. Arthaśāstra was looked upon as having come from such a hoary antiquity that it was believed to have emanated from the divine, and not from the human mind." Now the correct meaning of the reference to Arthaśāstra in the verse above stated seems to be that Kauṭilya brought the science from a state of chaos to order and harmony, not that he recovered it from oblivion (Infra, Ch. III). The second argument is of little or no weight, since if Kauṭilya fails to quote Gaurasīras, the Mahābhārata is silent about other authors of the Arthaśāstra that are mentioned by Kauṭilya. Such are Parāśara (Kaut. pp. 13, 27, 32, 323, and 328), Piśuna (Ibid pp. 14, 28, 33, 253, 323, and 329), Vātavyādhi (Kaut. pp. 14, 33, 263, 324, 330), and Kātyāyana, Kaṇinka Bhāradvāja, Dirghachārāyaṇa (or perhaps Chārāyaṇa, vide Shamasastri's Revised Edition of Kauṭilya's Arthaśāstra, Introduction, p. xxi) Ghoṭamukha, Kiṅjalka as well as Piśunaputra (Kaut. p. 251). Nor can it be definitely proved that Kauṭilya was unacquainted with Gaurasīras. It is not at all improbable that Gaurasīras is identical with the equally mysterious masters of the Arthaśāstra (āchāryyas) whom Kauṭilya quotes no less than

Before proceeding to analyse the leading ideas and concepts of the early Arthaśāstra authors, it will be well to consider the nature and scope of the science which they brought into vogue. As regards the first point, the evidence is of a twofold character.

forty-two times, much oftener than he quotes the other schools and teachers of the Arthaśāstra. Even if the two were independent personages, it may be argued that Kauṭilya had no occasion for mentioning Gauraśiras, since he only quotes the older authors when he has to cite a chain of discussion in which they figure or else refutes their views. Another ground on which Kauṭilya's silence about Gauraśiras may be explained without committing oneself to Dr. Bhandarkar's theory is that the latter author lived or at least came into prominence in the interval between the composition of Kauṭilya's work and that of the Śāntiparvan. For it is only a gratuitous assumption, running counter to the generally accepted view on this point, to state that the composition of the Śāntiparvan was prior to that of the Kauṭilya. The third argument involves a *petitio principii*, since it takes for granted apparently on the strength of the second argument that the Śāntiparvan was composed earlier than the Arthaśāstra of Kauṭilya. Moreover, it fails to give the true explanation of Brahmā's creation of the science of Daṇḍanīti. This view of the origin of the science is indeed not peculiar to the Mahābhārata. Vātsyāyana, in the beginning of his Kāmasūtra, describes how Prajāpati (Brahmā) created the people and recited to them a work of 100,000 chapters showing the way towards the acquisition of virtue, wealth, and desire. Afterwards the three parts relating to these ends were separated respectively by Manu, Brihaspati, and Nandin. A closer approximation to the story of the Mahābhārata occurs in the late mediæval work called the Śukranītisāra. According to its author (I. 2-4), the Self-existent One (Brahmā) recited the Nītiśāstra consisting of 100 lacs of verses for the good of the world, and afterwards abstracts of this work were prepared by Vaśiṣṭha, Śukra and others in the interests of kings and other persons whose tenure of existence was limited. Nevertheless it is difficult to subscribe to the view that the ascription of divine origin to Daṇḍanīti in the Śāntiparvan was merely due to its hoary antiquity. That the canonical author was aware of the human origin of the science is evident from an alternative story of its creation which is thus summarised by

Kauṭilya writes in the concluding chapter of his work, " 'Artha' is the means of subsistence (vritti) of men ; it is, in other words, the earth which is filled with men. Arthaśāstra is the science (śāstra) (which deals with) the mode of acquisition and protection of that (earth)." * This definition is applied by

Prof. D. R. Bhandarkar (op. cit. p. 93) : " In Chapter 235 of the Śāntiparvan we have another tradition narrated about this work (viz., the archetypal work of Brahmā on Daṇḍanīti). There its authorship has been ascribed to eight sages, who read it out to the god Nārāyaṇa. The god was exceedingly pleased with what he heard, and said : ' Excellent is this treatise that ye have composed consisting of a hundred thousand verses.....Guided by it Svāyambhuva Manu will himself promulgate to the world its code of dharma, and Uśanas and Brihaspati compose their treatises based upon it'. We are then told that this original work of the sages will last up to the time of king Uparicharu and disappear upon his death." To understand the real significance of the theory of divine creation of Daṇḍanīti, it is necessary to consider the object with which the section on kingly duties in the Śāntiparvan seems to have been written. This, we think, was nothing less than the formulation of the sum of duties relating to the king, conceived with an almost exclusive reference to his public functions. In these circumstances nothing would be more natural than for the author to magnify the extreme antiquity and authoritative character of Daṇḍanīti, the essence of which he incorporated in his system. We are therefore inclined to hold that it was with a deliberate purpose, and not merely out of mere forgetfulness of its human origin, that the fiction of divine creation of Daṇḍanīti was introduced into the Śāntiparvan.✓

* Kauṭilya's Arthaśāstra, Revised edition by R. Shamasastri, p. 426. Dr. Shamasastri (English translation, p. 515) translates this passage as follows :✓ The subsistence of mankind is termed ' artha,' wealth ; the earth which contains mankind is also termed ' artha,' wealth ; that science which treats of the means of acquiring and maintaining the earth is the Arthaśāstra, Science of Polity.✓ Here earth (bhūmi) is evidently taken to be the alternative meaning of ' artha.' It is interpreted by Mr. K. P. Jayaswal in the same sense in his translation of the above passage (q. v.). We are very much

Kauṭilya to the early Arthaśāstra works in his very opening lines where he describes the plan of his own treatise. He writes, "This single Arthaśāstra has been prepared by summarising nearly all the Arthaśāstra works that were written by the early masters with regard to the acquisition and protection of the earth." (The second line of argument is concerned with the interpretation of the parallel concept of Daṇḍanīti. Kauṭilya writes in one place, Daṇḍanīti is the means of acquiring what is not gained, protecting what is gained, increasing what is protected and bestowing the surplus upon the deserving."* It is evident that this is but an amplification of the category of acquisition and protection mentioned in the foregoing definition.† Now both the Manusamhitā and the Mahābhārata mention the four functions stated by Kauṭilya in such a way as to make them the essence of the king's occupation‡

inclined to doubt whether the above interpretation is the correct one. In our opinion the author clearly intends in the above passage to use 'ityarthah' in the sense of the secondary signification of the first 'artha' which, as here used, is a technical term. A much later writer, Sarvānanda, while explaining the term 'Arthaśāstra,' likewise takes 'bhūmi' to be the derivative, and not the alternative, meaning of 'artha.' He writes (commentary on Amarakoṣa I. 6. 5): arthāḥ hiraṇyādayasteṣu pradhānamartha bhūmiritareṣām tadyonitvāt.

* Kaut. p. 9.

† Śaṅkarāryya indeed states (commentary on Kāmandaka I. 8) that the increase of what is protected is a form of acquisition while the bestowal upon the deserving is a kind of protection.

‡ Thus Manu (VII 99-101) not only enjoins the king to pursue these functions, but he also describes them as the fourfold means of securing the ends of human existence. The Mahābhārata (Śāntiparvan, CXL 5-70) quotes a dialogue between the sage Bhāradvāja and the king Śatruñjaya concerning the means of fulfilling these four functions.

Kāmandaka, indeed, expressly styles them as such.* Since the Arthaśāstra is, from the first, connected with the institution of the monarchic State, it follows that there is a general agreement of the canonical as well as the secular writers concerning the nature of the science. This shows that the definition of Dandanīti was not introduced by Kauṭilya, but it went back to the old authors of the Arthaśāstra. (It would appear from the above that Arthaśāstra was essentially the Art of Government in the widest sense of the term.) But although such was the strict definition of the science, it tended almost from the first to embrace a mass of abstract speculation within its orbit. The extracts cited by Kauṭilya show that the discussion of the concrete problems of administration led the early teachers of Arthaśāstra to enquire into the essential nature of the State institutions. The Mahābhārata, above all, reproduces numerous extracts from the early Arthaśāstra authors, involving, as we shall presently see, the

Kām. I 20 : "The acquisition of wealth by righteous means, (its) protection, increase and bestowal upon the deserving form the fourfold occupation of the king (rājavrittam chaturvidham)†"

† Mr. K. P. Jayaswal's interpretation of Arthaśāstra (*Calcutta Weekly Notes*, Vol. XV, p. cclxxv) which is based upon his own version of the passage quoted above from Kauṭilya (p. 426) is different. He first translates this passage as follows :—"Society is men's instinct. Territorial division of humanity is 'Society.' The science of well-being and development of the territorial unit is the Arthaśāstra." "In other words," he continues, "the science of development of territorial groupings of the social animal called man is what Kauṭilya styles the Arthaśāstra. We may render it into English as the science of the Common Wealth." We consider both this version and its interpretation to be far-fetched and untenable.

treatment of such abstract questions as the nature of the king's office and the mutual relations of the sovereign and his subjects.

✓ Arthaśāstra, then, while strictly meaning the art of public administration, tends in effect to include the theory of the State as well. ✓ Let us next consider the scope of this science. ✓ A perusal of Kautilya's work shows that this author treated the subjects of central and local administration, home and foreign policy, as well as civil law and the art of warfare. As Kautilya's work is admittedly a summary of the early Arthaśāstra literature, the natural presumption is that the same topics were dealt with in either case. This is reduced to a certainty by Kautilya's own citations which make it abundantly clear that all the above subjects were treated by his predecessors. ✓

* For references to the civil law in the early Arthaśāstra literature, vide Kaut. pp. 157, 161, 162, 164, 177, 185, 192, 196, 198. As regards references to the art of war, vide Ibid p. 375. The references to the public administration as well as internal and external policy are quoted in the course of the present section.

✓ A word may be added about the method of the Arthaśāstra. A perusal of the treatise of Kautilya is enough to show that the conclusions of the Arthaśāstra authors were reached by a process of reasoning based upon the facts of human nature and of political life. The method of these writers, in other words, was an empirical one. In Kautilya, who has left us the only complete work of Arthaśāstra now extant, the empirical method is supplemented by some very interesting applications of what may be called the historical method. In one place (Ibid pp. 11-12), e.g., Kautilya is solemnly urging the king to master the category of six senses which he calls the 'six enemies.' In stressing this point he quotes the instances of no less than eleven kings or republican communities (saṅghas) that perished through indulgence of the senses, while he mentions two kings who won success through their self-restraint. For other instances of the use of the historical method, vide Ibid pp. 41, 329, 360.

Such, then, is the skeleton outline of the science of Arthaśāstra.* In order to understand its true

* What is the relation of the concept of Daṇḍanīti to that of the Arthaśāstra? Apart from the category of four functions included within the sphere of Daṇḍanīti which has been stated above, Kautilya gives two interpretations of the term. He defines it (p. 9.) in its narrow etymological sense of the direction (nīti) of punishment (daṇḍa), while elsewhere (p. 6) he indicates its scope more broadly as comprising both right and wrong policy (nayanayau). It follows from the above that Daṇḍanīti, while strictly meaning the art of punishment, is, in effect, the art of government. Its scope, then, even in its latter sense, falls short of that of the Arthaśāstra. A tacit recognition of the difference between Daṇḍanīti and Arthaśāstra may perhaps be traced in the fact that while Kautilya adheres to the traditional classification of the sciences in which Daṇḍanīti is separated from Trayī, he makes Arthaśāstra a branch of the Vedas by including it in the category of Itihāsa. Ibid, pp. 6, 7, and 10.

In the subsequent period the shades of difference between Daṇḍanīti and Arthaśāstra were obliterated so that the two became convertible terms. Compare Amarakoṣa (I. 6. 5) : ānvīkṣiki daṇḍanīti tarkavidyāthaśāstrayoh.

Mr. K. P. Jayaswal (*Calcutta Weekly Notes*, Vol. XV, p. cc lxxv) translates Daṇḍanīti as the Ethics of the Executive. There is no warrant for this interpretation, so far as we are aware, in Hindu political theory. As we have seen above, Kautilya gives the etymological signification of Daṇḍanīti. This is amplified by the later writers who seize the occasion to explain the meaning of the terms daṇḍa and nīti in the above definition. Thus Kāmandaka (III 15) writes, "Restraint (damah) is known as daṇḍa; daṇḍa is the king, since it resides in him; the direction (nīti) of daṇḍa is daṇḍanīti; nīti is so called because it directs." This paraphrase is reproduced with a slight verbal change in the Śukranītisāra (I 157). Similarly Kṣīrasvāmin (commentary on Amarakoṣa, I 5. 5.) writes, "Daṇḍa is restraint or that by which (one) is restrained; daṇḍanīti or Arthaśāstra is that by which restraint is directed, i.e., applied to those deserving to be restrained." Apart from this primary meaning of Daṇḍanīti the later authors give its secondary or derivative sense which brings their definition into line with Kautilya's description of the scope of the science. Thus Śaṅkarāryya, commenting on the above passage from Kāmandaka, writes, "The term

nature, it is further necessary to consider what the authors with whom we are now concerned believe to be its relation to the sister sciences. An interesting sidelight is thrown upon this point by Kauṭilya's quotation of a short discussion relating to the list of the sciences (vidyās). It appears that the sciences were traditionally held to be four in number, namely, the sacred canon (trayī), philosophy (ānvik-ṣakī), the art of government (daṇḍanīti), as well as agriculture, cattle-breeding, and trade (vārttā). This division, which evidently gave due weight to the claims of secular as well as sacred learning, proved to be unacceptable to three of the radical schools preceding Kauṭilya. The school of Manu excluded philosophy, from the list of sciences on the ground that it was merely a branch of the Vedas. More sweeping is the criticism of the other two schools. The school of Brihaspati excluded, in addition to philosophy, the Vedas which it characteristically declared to be merely a pretext for a man versed in worldly affairs. Thus Daṇḍanīti and Vārttā alone, according to this prince of materialists, are entitled to rank as

'damah,' stands for the nature of 'daṇḍa' as well as for 'daṇḍa' in the sense of a specific expedient of public policy. Now the author ignores the nature of 'daṇḍa' on the ground that policy has for its subject-matter all the elements, and he has in view the expedient taking the form of punishment alone; hence he says, 'damo daṇḍah' etc. Although conciliation, dissension and gift are possible as expedients of policy, nīti is generally called by this alone, because mankind is preponderantly wicked in its nature... Or the term daṇḍa here signifies restraint alone, and should be understood to include the limitless expedients of conciliation and the rest, which are the means of restraining one's own and enemy's partisans." Compare Sarvānanda, commentary on Amara-koṣa, I. 6. 5.

sciences.* This view would seem to mark the extreme swing of the pendulum from the position of the Dharmasūtras, in which rājadharma was held to be part and parcel of the canonical scheme of duties. But the tendency towards simplification of the list of sciences did not end with Brihaspati. The school of Uśanas (Śukra) took the last step, and proclaimed Daṇḍanīti to be the only science on the ground that the operations (ārambhāh) of all other sciences are fixed therein. † Politics, then, according to this ultra-political school, is the one master-science furnishing the key to all the rest.

Let us pause here to compare the concept of Arthaśāstra with that of the king's duties (rājadharma) figuring in the canonical Dharmasūtras. This comparison must be understood to refer to the common element in both the concepts, namely, the category of public functions of the king. From this standpoint it appears that both Arthaśāstra and Rājadharma have virtually the same nature, involving in either case the art of government in a monarchic State. The Arthaśāstra, however, confines itself exclusively to the investigation of the phenomena of the State, while Rājadharma deals with the same as an incident in a comprehensive scheme of duties ordained by the Creator. Hence while the canonical writers mention only the rudi-

* In the parallel passage of Kāmandaka (III 3-5) paraphrasing Kauṭilya's text, the view of the school of Brihaspati is based upon the argument that mankind is principally addicted to the pursuit of wealth (lokasyārthapradhānavāt).

† Śaṅkarāryya, commenting on the parallel passage of Kāmandaka (III. 5), illustrates this argument by the analogy of the nave of a chariot-wheel (rathanābhiyaṭ).

ments of public administration, the secular authors are able to treat their subject on a vastly enlarged canvas: they treat the institutions of the State alike in their normal and healthy as well as abnormal and diseased condition, and make the first serious attempt to grapple with the concrete problems of administration. A second point of comparison suggests itself in connection with the basis of the parallel concepts. Arthaśāstra, as we have seen, is independent of the sacred canon, and is the product of the (secular) schools and individual teachers. Hence it lacks the positive character attaching to the Rājadharmā by virtue of the latter's association with the great concept of Dharma (Law or Duty). We may, lastly, compare the twin concepts from the point of view of Ethics. Since Rājadharmā is equivalent to the Whole Duty of the king, its rules are determined by the ideal of the highest good of this individual. Arthaśāstra, on the other hand, has avowedly for its end the security and prosperity of the State. Accordingly its rules of kingly conduct are determined primarily with reference to the interests of the State alone.*

Although Rājadharmā was specially a concept of the sacred canon, there was one secular teacher who treated the similar concept of Kṣatriyadharmā in his own system, and made it the basis of comparison with the parallel groups of duties (dharmas). This

* At a later period, in the Rājadharmā sections of the Śāntiparvan and the Manusamhitā, the canonical authors absorbed the system of the Arthaśāstra in their grand synthesis of kingly duties. The result was that the distinction between Arthaśāstra or Daṇḍanīti and Rājadharmā became one of nomenclature alone. Infra, Chap. IV.

estimate was naturally coloured by the limited outlook of the author whose horizon was bounded by his subject.* In the Śāntiparvan Bhīṣma quotes a remarkable address uttered by the god Indra who, it will be remembered, is elsewhere mentioned as an author of the science of polity,† and is quoted by Kauṭilya in the person of his follower.‡ In the passage in question king Māndhātā addressing the god says, "I have attained immeasurable worlds and spread my fame by following the extensive duties of the Kṣatriyas. I do not know how to fulfil the chiefest duty which emanated from the primeval God." Indra replies that those who are not kings and seek for virtue do not attain the highest felicity. The duty of the Kṣatriya was first produced out of the primeval God, and then came the other duties which are its parts, as it were. The remaining duties have been created as possessing a limit, but the duty of the Kṣatriya has no limits and has many systems. Since all the duties are absorbed in this duty, it is declared to be the highest. As the classes (varṇas), Indra goes on, observe their respective duties by the help of the Kṣatriya duty, the former duties are declared to be useless. Those

* Similarly Kauṭilya at the close of his work declares that the Arthasāstra secures the acquisition and protection of this and the next world, and that, while setting in motion and guarding the threefold end of existence, it destroys the reverse.

† Cf. Śāntiparvan, LVIII 2 and LIX 83.

‡ The term used by Kauṭilya is Bāhudantiputra, which means, according to Prof. D. R. Bhandarkar (op. cit. p. 95), "a follower of Bāhudantin (Indra), i.e. of the system of Arthasāstra laid down by him."

who do not observe the established usage and are constantly engaged in the pursuit of desirable objects, are declared to be persons having the nature of beasts : as the duty of the Kṣatriyas secures for them the right course by the application of means contributing to their welfare (arthayogāt), it is better than the duty of the orders (āśramas).* In this extract, it will be noticed, the author brings the concept of Kṣatriyadharmā into relation with other branches of dharma, and awards it the palm of excellence. This, it is urged, subsumes the other dharmas : it is the mainspring of the duties of the classes (varṇadharmā), and it is the instrument for directing the untamed man to the pursuit of the good life.

Although the definition of Arthasāstra was sufficiently wide to apply to monarchies as well as republics, it was the former type of State that fixed itself in the standard categories and concepts of this science. An interesting discussion quoted by

* Śāntiparvan, Ch. LXIV 10 ff. ; LXV 6-7.

† In consequence of this association the Hindu science of polity was identified at a later date with the institution of the monarchic State. Thus the Mahābhārata (Śāntiparvan Ch. LVIII 3) applies the significant designation of writers of treatises on the kingly science (rājasāstrapraṇetārah) to seven specified authors of the Arthasāstra. In the same work Daṇḍanīti is so thoroughly identified with the monarchic State that Bhīṣma (Ibid LIX 5-136), replying to a query about the origin of kingship, begins by describing the creation of the science by the god Brahmā. Kāmandaka (I 7-8) uses the epithet 'rājavidyā' as a synonym for the science of polity. In the Śukranītisāra (IV 3. 56) Arthasāstra is explicitly defined as involving the instruction of kings in good behaviour : srutismṛtyavirodhena rājavrittādīśāsanam suyuktyārthārjanam yatra hyarthaśāstram taduchyate

Kauṭilya* concerning the relative seriousness of the 'calamities' thereof, shows that the early authors of the Arthaśāstra accepted as an article of their political creed the category of (seven elements of sovereignty.†) These consist of the king (svāmin), the minister

* pp. 322-324.

† The technical term that is used as the designation of the seven constituent elements of sovereignty is 'prakṛiti' (cf. Kaut. VI 1, VIII 1, Ibid 2; Kāmandaka, VII, XXI-XXII; Manusamhitā IX 294; Yājñavalkya I 353). Besides the category of seven elements Kauṭilya (p. 259) includes the hostile king in the list of 'prakritis.' ('Prakṛiti' is also applied to mean the twelve constituent parts of the 'mandala' or system of States: these multiplied by five (scill. the seven elements of sovereignty except the king and the ally) yield sixty 'prakritis' and the total of seventy-two) (Kaut. pp. 260-261; Manusamhitā VII 156). (The third sense in which 'prakṛiti' is used in the literature of Hindu polity is citizens or a corporation of citizens.) Thus the lexicographer Kātya, who is older than Amarasinha (fl. 4th cent. A. D.) gives 'paurāh' and 'amātyā' as the synonyms of the term (vide the quotation of Kṣīrasvāmin, commentary on Amarakośa II 8. 18). The Amarakośa (loc. cit.) gives the synonyms 'prakṛitayah,' 'rājyāṅgāni' and 'paurānām śreṇayah,' while Śāśvata, who belonged to the close of the 6th and the beginning of the 7th century, has the equivalents 'prakṛitih' 'paurah' and 'amātyādih'; 'It is very probable that 'prakṛiti' in the sense of the element of sovereignty was known to the authors of the Arthaśāstra before Kauṭilya's time, for that writer (p. 430) claims the credit of originality for applying the term to the members of the maṇḍala alone. Kāmandaka indeed quotes (VIII 5) Brihaspati as saying that sovereignty consists of seven prakritis.)

The term prakṛiti, in its application to the category of seven elements, has been translated by some scholars (e.g. Bühler, S. B. E. Vol. XXV, p. 395) as the constituent part of a kingdom. Others (e.g. K. P. Jayaswal, *Calcutta Weekly Notes* Vol. XV. p. 275) translate it as the element of sovereignty. Dr. Shamasastri interprets it in both ways, (vide English translation of Kauṭilya's Arthaśāstra pp. 319, 395). The difficulty in this case arises from the fact that 'rājyam' of which the seven elements are declared to be the

(amātya), the territory (janapada), the fort (durga), the treasury (koṣa), the army (daṇḍa), and the ally (mitra).* This list implies, to begin with, the monarch who is the apex of the administrative structure. The king, however, is not an omniscient and self-sufficient despot, for the amātya is declared to be one of his indispensable adjuncts. Further, the above definition includes the material, the financial, and the military, appliances of government. Lastly, it comprises, and this is significant of the enormous importance of foreign policy in the system

component parts or limbs (cf. Manusamhitā IX. 294-295; Śāntiparvan LXIX 64-65; Kāmandaka VII 1 Amarakoṣa I. 3. 5; Śukranīti I 61) is capable of a twofold interpretation. (Etymologically it means royalty or sovereignty (rājāḥ karma bhāvo vā), and derivatively it signifies a kingdom.) Now neither Kauṭilya nor Kāmandaka has cared to define 'rājya,' nor indeed does it appear that the distinction between State and Government presented itself to them or any other Hindu political philosopher. (We are inclined to hold that the category of seven elements implies the concept of 'sovereignty,' or 'government' rather than 'State' or 'Kingdom'.) This interpretation is supported by the definition in a later work of 'rājyam' in its application to the seven limbs. Śaṅkarāryya, commenting upon Kāmandaka's list of the seven elements (I 18) writes, "'Rājyam' is kingship or kingly function (rājatvam), which is used to signify the appellation and the connotation of the term king."

* In the above list we have translated 'amātya' as minister. In the Arthasāstra works, however, the term, strictly speaking, is a genus of which the councillors (mantrins) are a species. Thus Kauṭilya (p. 17) writes that the 'amātyas' who are purified by all the four tests should be appointed mantrins. The lexicon of Amara has preserved the same sense of difference between the two terms. It has (II. 8. 4) 'mantri dhisachivohmātyah anye karmasachivāstatah,' on which Kṣīrasvāmin comments as follows: 'tato mantrino anye amātyāḥ karmasahāyāḥ niyogyākhyāḥ.' In later times amātya and mantrin became convertible terms. Thus Sarvānanda, commenting on the above verse from Amara, writes 'mantritrayam mantrīni.'

of the Arthaśāstra, an allied king.* We may thus sum up the essential features of the Arthaśāstra idea of Government by saying that it involves a king assisted by his minister and foreign ally and equipped with the necessary material appliances.✓

✓The category of seven elements obviously involves the consideration of government from the point of view of its composition. Another political category which goes back to the same early period deals with the king as the reservoir of power.✓ Kauṭilya quotes in one place † the opinion of an early teacher regarding the relative importance of the three 'powers' (śaktis) of the king. This shows that the category in question had at an early period become the possession of the Arthaśāstra.✓The three 'powers' are the power of good counsel (mantraśakti), the majesty of the king himself (prabhuśakti), and the power of energy (utsāhaśakti). Kauṭilya defines these as consisting respectively in the strength of knowledge, that of the army and the treasury, and that of heroic valour.‡ This category, so far as it goes, obviously exhibits the State as ruled by the human qualities of physical might, energy and knowledge. The State, in other words, is viewed as a work of art, requiring the exercise of the king's mental and moral qualities for its successful direction.§✓

* It is pertinent to observe in this connection that the concept of 'maṇḍala,' which like that of the seven elements is one of the fundamental propositions of the early Arthaśāstra makes the individual king part and parcel of a system of States.

† p. 339.

‡ p. 261.

§ The rule of chance indeed is not altogether eliminated. Both Kauṭilya (p. 821) and Kāmandaka (XXI 18-21), e.g.,

Such are the two concepts of government that are taken by the authors, whom Kaṭilya quotes, to be the ground-work of their system.) As we have hinted above, these authors proceed to weigh the relative importance of the constituent elements in each case. In the instance of the category of seven elements, they treat the point as a question of political pathology. They consider the elements, in other words, not in their normal healthy state, but in their abnormal diseased condition which is technically called 'vyasana.' Among the 'vyasanas' of the seven elements, it was asked, what was the scale of relative seriousness? The unnamed author so often quoted by Kaṭilya held that in the list of the king, the minister, the territory, the fort, the treasury, the army, and the friend, the 'calamity' of each preceding one was more important than that of the one immediately following. This gradation was adversely criticised by other teachers who considered the 'calamities' of the elements in a series of successive pairs.* We are not here concerned with the arguments, but we must not miss the general significance of the arrangement in a graded scale. (This unmistakably points to the fact that the idea of organic unity of government had not yet dawned upon the minds of the Hindu political thinkers.

divide the 'calamities' befalling the component elements of sovereignty into two kinds, namely, the providential and the human. In another place (p. 260) Kaṭilya states that the three-fold status of a kingdom, namely, its decline, stagnation and progress, is determined by good and bad policy as well as by good and evil fortune, for both providential and human causes govern the world.

* Kauṭ. pp. 322-324.

As regards the category of three powers, the authority whom Kauṭilya quotes under the reverent title of the preceptors (āchāryyas) considers the king's energy to be more important than his majesty. The king, it is argued, who is brave strong and armed, is himself able with the help of his army to overpower a powerful enemy, while his army, small though it is, fired by his prowess, is capable of performing its task : on the other hand, the king who is devoid of energy but has a strong army perishes, overpowered by heroic valour. The same teacher, it further appears, held on other grounds that the king's majesty was superior to good counsel.* ✓ According to this view, then, statecraft is primarily a race for the display of personal energy, and only secondarily a game of craft and skill. ✓

✓ In assimilating the monarchic State within their own concepts and categories, the Arthaśāstra followed a parallel line of development with the canonical Dharmasūtras which, as we have seen in another place, recognise the king as a normal element in the social system. † The Arthaśāstra, however, did a distinct service to the cause of political theory by ruling out the 'purohita' from the list of proximate factors of government. ✓ The royal chaplain, as we have observed elsewhere, was magnified in the Brāhmaṇa works as the earthly Providence guarding both the king and the kingdom. In the Dharmasūtras he is figured as helping the fulfilment of the king's special duties

* Kauṭ. p. 330.

† Supra, p. 62.

as a king and general duties as a householder.* Now the early teachers of the Arthasāstra did not probably ignore this powerful individual. Kauṭilya, indeed, requires the king to follow his 'purohita' as a disciple does his preceptor, a son his father and a servant his master, while he places this functionary in the front rank of the State officials.† Nevertheless, as will appear from the above, the 'purohita' is conspicuous by his absence in the list of the seven elements, while a place is found therein for the minister and the ally. Nor is the purohita's special skill in the use of charms and spells included in the list of three 'powers' of the king.✓

The theories of kingship laid down by the teachers whom we are now considering, it seems to us, carry into fuller detail such ideas as are hinted at in some of the Dharmasūtras.✓ For while these authors emphasize on the one hand the principle of monarchical authority, they inculcate on the other hand rules and principles tending to check the abuses of the royal power.✓ We have thus, in the first place, a number of passages stressing the enormous importance of the king's office from the point of view of the needs and interests of the people.✓ As the monarchic State is the norm and type of polity in Hindu political theory, these passages might, we think, be also taken to embody the authors' view of the function of the State in relation to the individual.✓ We shall commence with a short extract quoted by Bhīṣma from Bhārgava's (Śukra's) discourse on

* Cf. Vas. XIX. 5.

† Kauṭ. pp. 16, 247.

kingly policy. "One should first have the king, then the wife and afterwards wealth, for if there were no king, how (could one enjoy) the wife and the wealth?"* To put the main idea of this passage into the technical language of political theory, it means that the king's office is the security of the institutions of family and property. This idea is brought out more fully in a longer extract of the Mahābhārata. In Chapter LXVIII of the Śāntiparvan we are told how Vasumanas put to the sage Brihaspati the very suggestive query, "Through whom do the creatures flourish and decay?" In reply the sage describes in burning language both the evils happening in the king's absence, and the blessings following from his existence. The duties of the people, he says, have their root in the king; the people do not devour one another through the fear of the king alone; as creatures would plunge in dense darkness owing to the non-appearance of the sun and the moon, as fishes in shallow water and birds in a safe place would fight one another and assuredly perish, so would these people die without the king, and they would sink into utter darkness like cattle without the herdsman. (If the king were not to afford protection, property (lit. the sense 'this is mine') would not exist; neither wife nor child nor wealth would be possessed; everywhere wealth would be stolen.)

* Śāntiparvan, LVII 41. In the above extract we accept with Prof. D. R. Bhandarkar (op. cit., p. 187) the reading 'ākhyāte rājacharite' of the South Indian recension in the place of 'ākhyāne rāmacharite' of the Bengal and Bombay recensions. We also adopt Dr. Bhandarkar's identification of Bhārgava with Śukra.

various kinds of weapons would be hurled against the virtuous ; vice would be approved ; the parents, the aged persons, the preceptors and the guests would suffer pain or death ; there would be neither disapproval of adultery nor agriculture nor trade-routes ; virtue would perish and the Vedas would not exist ; there would be no sacrifices attended with rich presents according to rule, no marriages and no convivial meetings ; every one would perish in an instant, being afflicted with fear and troubled in heart, uttering cries of woe and losing consciousness. When the king affords protection, it is urged on the other hand, the people sleep with the doors of their houses unbarred ; the women, decked with all ornaments and unguarded by males, fearlessly walk about the streets ; the people practise virtue instead of harming one another ; the three classes perform great sacrifices of various kinds ; the science of agriculture and trade (vārttā) which is the root of this world exists in good order.* The gist of the long extract just quoted may perhaps be expressed by saying that the happiness and indeed the existence of the people, the institutions of society, the rules of morality and religion as well as the sciences and the arts, depend upon the king's office, or, to put it in a more general way, these have their being in the organised political society represented as usual by the monarchic State. Apart from its value as thus constituting a strong argument in favour of the king's authority, the above passage has, we think, another significance. For it expresses in the course

* Ibid LXVIII 6, 8, 10-13, 15, 17-18, 21-22, 24, 30, 32-33, 35.

of the argument the author's conception of what may be called the natural state of man, the state, *i.e.*, in which there is no political superior. This of course excludes—and here we touch on one of the central ideas of the Hindu political thinkers—a belief in the natural instinct of man as itself forming the cement of social life. Furthermore, in the passage just quoted, the 'State of Nature,' as it may well be called, is specifically conceived as a condition of wild anarchy—a conception which, we think, here finds its first expression in Hindu literature, if we ignore the slight reference in a Brāhmaṇa text which has been quoted in another place.* The importance of this notion in subsequent times as forming the historical background of the theories of the origin of kingship will, it is hoped, be sufficiently demonstrated in the course of the following pages.

The above view of the king's office as subserving the primary needs and interests of the people might have sufficed, as it had done on a smaller scale in Gautama's Dharmaśāstra † to support the creed of royal authority. Nevertheless some of the teachers whom we are now considering invoke, in further justification of the king's authority over his subjects, a notion familiar to the Vedic Samhitās and the Brāhmaṇas, the notion, namely, of the king's divine nature. In the present instance, however, as we hope to show now, the latter idea is interpreted, mainly on the basis of equivalence of the king's functions to those of

* Supra, p. 41.

† Supra, p. 63.

the deities. Thus the two principles with which we have now to deal centre equally on the idea of essential importance of the king's office. ✓ Another point to be noted in this connexion—and here again the advance of the Arthaśāstra thought in comparison with that of the Dharmasūtras is unmistakable—is that the obligations of the subjects with reference to their ruler are conceived in the present case to be not merely negative but also positive in character.

Let us illustrate the above remarks with the help of concrete examples. ✓ In Chapter LXXII of the Śāntiparvan Bhīṣma describes what purports to be the discourse of the Wind-god to a king called Purūravas. There is nothing improbable in the god figuring in the list of Arthaśāstra teachers, since the Mahābhārata elsewhere mentions the gods Indra and Viśālākṣa (Śiva) as the authors of treatises on the Art of Government (rājaśāstra). ✓ The gods, the men, the Fathers, the demi-gods, the serpents and the demons, says the god of Wind in the course of the above address, live by sacrifices; but in a country without a king, there can be no sacrifice. The gods and the manes, he continues, live by the offering made in the sacrifice. ✓ The security and the increase of this virtue (dharma) depends upon the king alone. ✓ He who confers immunity from fear, concludes the sage, is alone entitled to high merit, for there is no gift existing in the three worlds equal to the gift of life. The king is the god Indra, he is Yama, he is virtue personified (dharma), he assumes different forms,

* Śāntiparvan LVIII 1-3.

he sustains all. In this extract, it will be observed, the argument based upon the value of the king's office as ensuring the condition of bare existence is complete by itself. Nevertheless the idea of the king's divinity based upon his identification with three specific deities is thrown in at the end, obviously to further strengthen the principle of authority. Again in Chapter LXV of the Śāntiparvan the god Indra is quoted as addressing king Māndhātā in the following fashion. Of the person who slights the king that is beyond doubt the lord of all, neither the gifts nor the libations nor the offerings to the manes bear fruit. Even the gods do not slight the king of virtuous desire, who is like an eternal god. The divine Lord of creatures (Prajāpati) created the whole world: he seeks the Kṣatriya for the purpose of directing the people towards virtue and leading them away from sin.† In this passage, it will be noticed, the author teaches by appeals to formidable spiritual sanctions the obligation of respectful submission on the part of the subjects, and he connects this with the theory of divine ordination of the Kṣatriya. ‡ We shall, lastly, refer to a lengthy extract of the Śāntiparvan purporting to embody the sage Brihaspati's reply to the king Vasumanas. "Through whose worship do the creatures attain imperishable bliss?" Such is the question put by the king as a rider to his query men-

* Ibid LXXII 20-26.

† Ibid LXV 28-30.

‡ The doctrine of divine ordination of the king is inculcated along with that of the Brāhmaṇa by another teacher quoted in the Mahābhārata. *Infra*, p. 109.

tioned above, which relates to the importance of the king's office. In reply the sage states, "Who will not worship the person in whose absence all creatures perish, and through whose presence they always live?" He who bears the king's burden, continues the sage, and follows the course which is dear and beneficial to him, conquers both the worlds. The man who even thinks of harming the king doubtless suffers pain here on earth, and goes to hell hereafter. The king must not be despised from an idea that he is a mere mortal, for he is a great deity in human form. He constantly assumes five forms, namely those of Fire, the Sun, Death, Kubera and Yama; he is Fire, when he burns the wicked with his majestic lustre; the Sun, when he oversees all beings by means of spies; Death, when he slays the impure persons by the hundred; Yama, when he applies severe punishment to the impious and fosters the pious; and Kubera, when he bestows wealth upon his friends and snatches it away from his enemies. The skilful man who desires to practise virtue and is persevering in his undertakings and who does not scorn the highest world, should not revile the king. He who acts against the king, be he his son, brother, favourite or like his own self, does not attain happiness. One should shun all the king's wealth from a distance, and he should abhor theft of the king's property as he abhors death. If he were to touch the king's property, he would instantly perish like deer touching a trap. The intelligent man should guard the king's property as he guards his own. Those who steal the king's property sink for a long time into a deep, terrible, unprosperous, and senseless

hell.* Here, it will be observed, the teacher combines, in an attempt to justify the principle of authority, the conceptions relating as well to the essential importance of the king's office as to his divinity. The latter idea, it may be further noted, is derived from a metaphorical assimilation of the king's functions with those of five specified deities: the divinity, in other words, is held in this case to apply to the king's office rather than to his person. With the twofold notion of kingship just mentioned, the author connects, in the above extract, a list of duties on the part of the subjects, which he tries to enforce as usual by the threat of spiritual and temporal penalties. The duties, lastly, with which the subjects are charged in this case, are not merely, as in the preceding passage, of a negative kind: they pass by an insensible gradation from the negative act of non-slandering and of non-stealing, to the positive obligation of obeying the king's commands and sharing his burdens.

We have thus far considered those doctrines of the nature of the king's office, which were properly interpreted by the teachers whom we are now considering, as pleas for the king's authority over his subjects. Let us proceed to examine the principles laid down by the same writers which tend to

* Ibid LXVIII 37-53. Verse 40 in the above extract, beginning with the words 'na hi jātyavamantavyo manuṣya iti bhūmipah', occurs in a slightly changed form in Manu (VII 8), while verse 41 in the former resembles verse 10 of the latter. This shows on the basis of the acknowledged principle of interpretation in such cases that both the above verses must have belonged to an earlier collection of metrical maxims. We have thus a corroborative testimony pointing to the antiquity of the extract cited above

limit that authority. ✓ As in the Dharmasūtras, so in this case it appears that protection is insisted upon as the cardinal duty of the king. This indeed, if we are to trust the references in the Śāntiparvan, is the view even of those teachers who are pronounced exponents of the monarchic cult. Thus in one place seven specified authors of treatises on the science of polity including Brihaspati and Indra are quoted by Bhīṣma as placing protection in the fore-front of the king's duties.* Again the Wind-god, in the course of the address from which we have already quoted, declares that the king acquires a fourth part of the spiritual merit earned by his well-protected subjects.† It is further to be observed that the doctrine of divine ordination of the Kṣatriya which, as we have seen, is put forth in one of the extracts of the Mahābhārata is so framed as to involve the king's divine duty of just government rather than his divine right to rule.‡ Finally, it may be mentioned that one of our present authors, in stressing the essential duty of protection, virtually imposes a limitation upon the duty of the subjects with reference to their ruler, as conceived by these thinkers. In Chapter LVII of the Śāntiparvan Bhīṣma quotes two verses from Prāchetasā Manu's discourse on the kingly duties. Prāchetasā Manu is included in the list of seven authors of treatises on the kingly science and he was no doubt the founder of the school so often quoted by Kauṭilya. Now in the above verses

* Ibid LVIII 1-4.

† Ibid LXXI 19-20.

‡ Ibid LXX 30; cf. supra, p. 94.

it is declared that six persons should be shunned like a split boat at sea. These are the preceptor who does not teach, the sacrificial priest who does not study the Vedas, the king who does not afford protection, the wife who has a sharp tongue, the milkman who wants to stay in the village, and the barber who seeks the forest.*

We may next mention a more important, and as it seems to us, original principle formulated by some of the teachers whom we are now considering. This consists in the idea of Justice or Righteousness as forming the rule of conduct on the part of the king. In the period with which we are here concerned, the classical text bearing on the above point is the long discourse of the sage Utathya, "the best of those versed in knowledge of the Supreme Being," which Bhīṣma quotes in Chs. XC-XCI of the Śānti-parvan. The most convenient approach to the idea of the teacher may perhaps be made through a number of passages inculcating on the king the necessity of his just rule. When sin is not restrained, says the sage, virtuous conduct disappears, vice reigns supreme, there is constant fear, property as well as the settled rule of the virtuous doth not exist, neither wife nor cattle nor fields nor houses are to be seen, the gods do not receive worship nor the Fathers their oblations of food, the guests are not honoured, the upper classes engaged in vows do not study the Vedas, the Brāhmaṇas do not perform the sacrifices, and the minds of men are bewildered like those of senile creatures: When

* Ibid LVII 44-47.

the king is intoxicated, Utathya mentions further on, there are born in families owing to the confusion of duties wicked monsters as well as the sexless, the defective in limb, the mute in speech and the diseased in mind : hence the king should particularly look to the welfare of his subjects. Returning to the former point, the author says that in the event of the king being intoxicated, there arise grave evils : unrighteousness leading to admixture of the castes grows in extent : there is cold in the hot season and *vice versa* : there is drought as well as heavy rain : diseases overtake the people : comets make their approach, inauspicious planets are seen and various evil omens portending the king's destruction are visible. When the king abjures virtue and is intoxicated, the sense of property (lit. 'mine-ness') does not exist. In a later passage we learn that the four ages of the world are comprised in the king's occupation, and that the king is the representative of the age. When the king is intoxicated, the four castes, the Vedas and the four orders, are thrown into complete confusion, and likewise the three-fold sacrificial fire, the sciences as well as the sacrifices attended with presents. The king himself is the maker of creatures as well as their destroyer.* These passages embody, apparently for the first time, a view which, it seems to us, is peculiar to Hindu political thought, namely that unrighteousness on the king's part is the cause of disturbance of the social, the moral and even the physical order. Conversely, it would appear, the king's righteous rule is the

* Ibid XC 8-12, 3337, 40 ; XCI 6-7.

foundation of the ordered existence of the world. Incidentally it may be noticed, the above extract declares the king in language of bold hyperbole to be the maker of his age and the arbiter of his subjects' destinies—an idea which, as here expressed, is obviously meant not so much to exalt the king's authority as to impress him with a sense of his responsibility. This conceit of the king's connection with the age-cycle is noticeable, since it is mentioned, as we hope to show later on, in the subsequent canonical as well as nītiśāstra literature.

✓ Not only does the sage Utathya ^{the author} conceive the king's righteous rule to be the foundation of the ordered existence of the people, but he also rises to the conception of righteousness being the bounden duty of the king. ✓ The king, he says in the opening lines of his address, exists for the sake of righteousness and not for self-gratification (dharmāya rājā bhavati na kāmakaraṇāya tu). The creatures, he continues, depend upon righteousness which in its turn depends upon the king: the king who rightly upholds virtue is indeed a king (lit. the lord of the world). The sages themselves, Utathya says further on, after casting their eyes on both the worlds created that exalted being of a king with the idea that he would be the guardian of virtue. This line of argument leads the teacher in the course of the above address to introduce, apparently for the first time, a sharp contrast between the (good king and the tyrant). If the king practises righteousness, it is urged, he attains very nearly the position of a god, while he goes to hell if he does the reverse. The person through whom righteousness flourishes is

verily called a king (rājan), while he through whom it decays is called by the gods the destroyer of righteousness (vriṣala). Of the same nature is the distinction drawn by the sage between the haughty and the modest king. One becomes a king, he says, by vanquishing pride and a slave by succumbing to it.*

Finally, the rule of righteousness, as inculcated by another teacher who is likewise quoted in the Śāntiparvan, is held however unconsciously to furnish the most effective limitation of the doctrine of submission and obedience on the part of the subjects. Addressing the king Vasumanas, as we learn from the above quotation, the sage Vāmadeva says, "Follow righteousness alone, there is nothing higher than righteousness, for it is those kings that are devoted to righteousness that succeed in conquering the earth." In developing this exhortation in the course of the following lines, the teacher throws out a remarkable plea in favour of tyrannicide which, so far as we are aware, strikes a new note in Hindu political theory. The unjust king who employs sinful and wicked ministers, says the sage, should be slain by the people (vadhya lokasya).†

It will appear from the above that the theories of kingship in the Arthaśāstra, while corresponding broadly to those of the Dharmasūtras, are not lacking in the formulation of original principles. Originality, however, is the dominant note of the rules of practical politics which constitute, as the definition of the science indicates, the core of the Arthaśāstra. This remark applies not merely to the rules themselves,

* Ibid XC 3-5, 13-15 : 27. † Ibid XCII 6 ; 9.

but also and above all to the ideas underlying them. The first and the most important point that arises in this connection is the consideration of the authors' attitude towards morality and religion. The remarkable criticism of the traditional list of sciences by three of the Arthaśāstra schools has shown us that, at least to two of them, namely, the schools of Brihaspati and Śukra, not only was the Art of Government an independent science by itself, but, what is more important, the holy Vedas themselves had no right to count as a branch of study bearing on the practical affairs of men. Yet it is neither Brihaspati nor Śukra that has left us what may be called the earliest specimens of Machiavellian statecraft in Hindu political theory. Kautilya cites in one place the views of various authors relating to the king's control of the princes. Bhāradvāja, we learn from this, prescribed secret punishment for those princes who were wanting in natural affection for their father: Vātavyādhi suggested that the princes should be seduced to sensual indulgence on the ground that revelling sons never hate their father: lastly, the Āmbhīyas (āchāryyas?) recommended that while one spy should tempt the prince to indulge in hunting, dice and women, another spy should prevent this.* These opinions exhibit, within the limited range of their application, an unmistakable disregard for morality for the sake of ensuring what is conceived to be the interest of the king. None of the teachers with whom we have now to deal, however, carried the subordination of morality to politics to

* Kaut. pp. 32-33.

such a pitch as Bhāradvāja. In Chapter CXL of the Śāntiparvan we are told how king Śatruñjaya asked Bhāradvāja as to the mode in which that which is not gained can be won, that which is acquired can be increased, that which is increased can be protected, and that which is protected can be given away. In these four functions is comprised, as we learn from the later testimony of the Manusamhitā and of Kāmandaka the whole compass of the king's activity.* The sage's reply, as might be expected, covers a wide range of home and foreign policy. It will be enough for our present purpose to extract some select passages out of this address. The king, we are told, should be humble in speech alone, but sharp at heart like a razor. He should carry his foe on his shoulders as long as the time is unfavourable, but when the opportunity arrives he should dash his enemy to pieces like an earthen pot on a piece of rock. The king who desires prosperity should slay the individual who thwarts his purposes, be this person even his son, brother, father, or friend. Without piercing the vitals of others, without committing cruel deeds, without slaying creatures even in the fashion of fishermen, one cannot attain high felicity. When wishing to smite, he should speak gently; after smiting, he should speak gentler still; after striking off the head with his sword, he should grieve and shed tears. The remnants of debt, fire and enemies, increase over and over again; hence he should not tolerate this remnant. These rules; the teacher concludes, have been

* Cf. p. 75, supra.

laid down for times of distress : why should not they be applied when one is attacked by an enemy? * For cold calculating treachery and heartless cruelty it would be hard to match the sentiments of the above passage except in the pages of the immortal author of the *Prince* whose name is naturally suggested by it. "Even the plea of inexorable necessity is not wanting to complete the analogy.

As Bhāradvāja advises the king to sacrifice the principles of morality to serve his own ends, so he counsels purchase of safety from foreign attack even at the cost of personal honour and self-respect. For the heartless exponent of a wicked Machiavelianism is also the pusillanimous advocate of a selfish materialism. Speaking with reference to the conduct of a weak king that is attacked by a powerful enemy, Kauṭilya quotes Bhāradvāja as saying that he who surrenders to the strong person surrenders to the god Indra. †

✓ If in the above passages Bhāradvāja makes the king's interest, such as he conceives it to be, the rule of public policy, in another place he drops out even this specious plea and advocates the gratification of individual ambition as the goal of statecraft. Kauṭilya quotes in one part of his work a long extract from Bhāradvāja relating to the conduct of the minister (amātya) in the event of the throne falling vacant. When the king is lying on his death-bed, Bhāradvāja says, the amātya may make the high-born princes and chiefs attack one another or other

* Śāntiparvan, CXL 13, 18, 47, 50, §70.

† Kauṭ. p. 382.

chiefs. He may further cause the victorious chief to be slain by rousing the hostility of the people. Or else he may secretly punish the high-born princes and chiefs and himself seize the kingdom. For, as this extreme champion of egotistic selfishness remarks, on account of the kingdom the father hates his sons and the sons their father; what, then, of the amātya who is the sole prop of the kingdom? The amātya should not, Bhāradvāja goes on, discard what has fallen into his hands of its own accord, for it is a popular saying that a woman making love of her own accord curses her man when she is discarded. Opportunity comes once only to a person who is waiting for the same, and it is hard to be attained again by the person who wants to accomplish his work.* In the above passage, we think, the statecraft of the early Arthaśāstra reaches its nadir. It has not even the saving grace of regard for the public interest which, in Machiavelli for instance, is the grand justification of the author. On the contrary the author parades his creed of unbridled selfishness and holds up the State itself as the standing example of its free play.

✓ In Bhāradvāja, then, the Machiavellian creed of the old Arthaśāstra is, as it were, incarnated. It would, however, be a mistake to suppose that this represents the universal or even general attitude of the early Arthaśāstra. Even in its existing fragmentary condition we can specify at least one individual teacher who made a stand against the wickedness and baseness of Bhāradvāja's statecraft. ✓ In

* Kauṭ. p. 255.

the same chapter in which Kauṭilya quotes the suggestion of Bhāradvāja relating to the secret punishment of undutiful princes, he quotes the views of other teachers of the Arthaśāstra. From this we learn that Viśālākṣa rejected the opinion of Bhāradvāja on the ground that the latter's suggestion involved cruelty, loss of fortune, and extinction of the seed of the Kṣatriyas.* Again we learn from Kauṭilya how Viśālākṣa, unlike Bhāradvāja, counselled the weak king to fight with all his strength against a powerful aggressor, for, as Viśālākṣa remarks, the display of prowess dispels calamities, while fighting is the particular duty of the Kṣatriya.†

From these remarks relating more or less to the general nature of the early Arthaśāstra statecraft, we proceed to consider the ideas underlying a specific branch of the same, the branch, namely, that is concerned with the rule of punishment (daṇḍa). In this case it might be doubted whether the Arthaśāstra broke absolutely new ground, since Gautama, the author of the Dharmaśāstra, hints in one place at the function of punishment as a restraining influence.‡ However that may be, Kauṭilya quotes in one passage a particular authority as saying, on the ground that there was no such means of bringing people under control as punishment, that the king should be ever ready to inflict this.§ Of the same nature is the view of Bhāradvāja quoted from his discourse to king Śatruñjaya in Chapter CXL of the

* Kauṭ. p. 32, R. Shamasastri's translation.

† Ibid p. 382.

‡ Gaut. XI 28.

§ Kauṭ. p. 9.

Śāntiparvan. “ Let him (viz. the king) be ever ready to strike, his prowess constantly displayed ; himself without a loophole, he should watch the loophole (of the enemy) and should seize the weak point of his foes. Of him who is ever ready to strike, the world stands very much in awe ; let him therefore make all creatures subject to himself by the employment of force.” * As these verses occur with slight changes in the Manusamhitā, † we have a corroborative evidence testifying to their antiquity. In the above passages, it will be observed, (punishment is conceived as the grand engine of social order.) Another verse which is similarly common to the Manusamhitā and the Mahābhārata goes further, and claims that punishment is, as it were, the active and beneficent Providence watching over the affairs of men. “ Punishment alone governs all created beings, punishment alone protects them, punishment watches over them while they sleep ; the wise declare punishment (to be identical with) the law.” ‡ The idea first mentioned, namely, that punishment is the great instrument of social order, receives a psychological setting in a third verse which is found alike in the Mahābhārata, and the Manusamhitā. “ The whole world is kept in order by punishment, for a guiltless man is hard to find ; through fear of punishment the whole world yields the enjoyments (which it owes)”. §

* Śāntiparvan CXL 7-8.

† VII 102-103.

‡ Manusamhitā VII 18 = Śāntiparvan XV 2.

§ Manusamhitā VI 22 = Śāntiparvan XV 34.

Let us next consider the views of our present authors with regard to the position of the Brāhmaṇa order in relation to the rest. In the early part of this chapter we have seen how Gautama in his Dharmaśāstra inculcated the old principle of the joint authority of the king and of the Brāhmaṇa by making them the source of individual existence as well as of the social and the moral order.* As between these powers, however, the authors of the Dharmaśāstras are content with reproducing the old Vedic texts relating to the Brāhmaṇa's independence of the king and the king's subordination to the Brāhmaṇa. The teachers whom we are now considering, while repeating the above views, ultimately push their theory to the extreme position of the Brāhmaṇas implying that the Brāhmaṇa is the one primary power, of which the king or the Kṣatriya is a derivative. In Chapter LXXII of the Śāntiparvan Bhīṣma quotes an old legend relating to the discourse of king Purūravas and the god of Wind. The god, after stating how the Brāhmaṇa, the Kṣatriya, the Vaiśya and the Śūdra, were produced respectively out of the mouth, the arms, the thighs, and the feet, of Brahmā says, "A Brāhmaṇa coming into existence is born as the highest on earth, the lord of all created beings, for the protection of the treasury of the law. Afterwards the Lord created the ruler of the world, the second caste, the Kṣatriya, that he might wield the sceptre for protecting the people. Brahman Himself has ordained that the Vaiśya should maintain these three castes by means of wealth and

* Cf. p. 66, supra.

agricultural produce and that the Śūdra should serve them." * As the first of these verses is identical with the verse I 99 of the Manusamhitā, it has evidently been borrowed in both the works from an earlier collection of metrical maxims, probably from the Arthashastra of the Wind-god Himself whom Bhīṣma quotes. The above passage, apart from its bearing on the relative position of the Brāhmaṇa and the king, seems to present some points of interest. It connects itself, to begin with, with the old Vedic dogma of creation of the four castes out of different parts of the Creator's body. Further, it seems to indicate beneath the mask of theological dogma a remarkable appreciation of the principle that we have met with in a passage of Baudhāyana, † the principle, namely, of the specialisation of functions and of the organic unity of society. Lastly, the above extract evidently implies, and this is what immediately concerns us here, that the Brāhmaṇa and the Kṣatriya are invested with a kind of superior authority over the others by right of birth, or else that of divine ordination. The point last mentioned, namely, that which involves the idea of divine ordination of the two powers, is directly mentioned in a verse which is common to the Śāntiparvan and the Manusamhitā. It reads, "For when the Lord of creatures (Prajāpati) created cattle, he made them over to the Vaiśya; to the Brāhmaṇa and to the king he entrusted all created beings." ‡

It thus appears that the teachers whom we are

* Śāntiparvan LXXII 6-8.

† Supra, pp. 60-61.

‡ Manusamhitā IX 327 = Śāntiparvan LX 23-24.